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It may be useful to give a distinction be-
tween the two modes in which technical 
artefacts can be seen (in-hand and put-
down). The difference between in hand and 
put-down is not simply between at-
tached/not attached to the body [Heidegger, 
1996]. 
There are two relatively independent levels 
of dividing: 
- Between put-down and in-hand. 
Put-down corresponds to the mode in 
which the artefact is the object of the explicit 
attention as an assembly of the matter with 
certain proprieties (the specifically scientific 
mode of relation to the object). One can 
think on the difference between designing 
and riding the bicycle. The in-hand mode is 
the mode in which the user is engaged in the 
activity, and in which, under normal condi-
tions, the artefact is transparent, one feels it 
like the extension of the body, not like the 
object of the physics [Merleau-Ponty, 1945]. 
- Between a normally functioning and a 
broken artefact. 
Now comes the situation in which the arte-
fact is broken. In this situation, the artefact 
switches from in-hand to put-down: instead 
of riding the bicycle and being engaged in the 
sensory-motor activity, one examines the 
broken chain as something having being 
made of the material with bad resistance, etc. 
It is the same case with the computers, 
even in virtual reality. As a user, one does not 
care about what is going on in the computer, 
which becomes a transparent equipment. 
When the artefact is broken or in case of a 
malfunction, the user will check cables, elec-
tricity, etc. He/she will then consider the 
computer as an object of science and tech-
nology, and the artefact is no more a trans-
parent mean of action. 
So one can as he/she wish be in different 
attitudes to artefact: consider it as in-hand or 
put-down (when maintaining the technical 
device, one puts it in the put-down mode). 
But the situation when the artefact breaks is 
particular, because it forces the user to con-
sider it as put-down. 
The difficulty comes when we consider the 
fact that in the put-down mode, the designer 
is also engaged in the activity. But in a differ-
ent way: the artefact is not a mean of action. 
In fact, when one is maintaining/designing 
or doing scientific research, he/she is using 
other artefacts (pencils/computer aided 
design/hammer or measurement instru-
ments), which are in-hand as means of ac-
tion, and which are transparent to the user. 
So one can see the put-down mode of the 
artefact as a derivative from the most funda-
mental one, which is in-hand. 
Now the in-hand mode was provisionally 
defined as an attachment to the body, in 
order to underline the fact that it is transpar-
ent and fits into action. But in fact the arte-
fact can be not attached to the body, but still 
in-hand. The road for example is not at-
tached to the body, but is still in-hand as a 
transparent mean of action. Being on the 
road, one does not consider the road as the 
physical proprieties of tarmac in the way the 
science/technology do, but rather as a possi-
bility to get there he/she wants to; the light-
ing pole on the road is not attached to the 
body, but it is still in-hand because it is also a 
mean of action of going there, and it (a) 
structures one’s actions and (b) is transparent 
in the sense mentioned above. 
If one agrees that the perception is not 
something independent from the action, then 
every artefact is the artefact that "help us 
do": the means of lighting probably change 
the sensory-motor loops (the light coming a 
certain way, one takes it into account without 
explicitly thinking on the proprieties of the 
light, and adapt his/her sensory-motor pos-
ture when riding a bicycle; when there is no 
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sufficiently light, one can be more focused on 
the auditory modality). So, as for the bicycle, 
the lighting pole is in-hand because it fits into 
one’s action and changes the sensory-motor 
activity. 
It stands to reason that there is still a dif-
ference between the artefact that are actually 
attached to the body, and which are not, but 
the first level of distinction seems to be 
between in-hand (in a broad sense) and put-
down. In this broad sense, the artefacts are in 
in-hand mode when they (a) fit into action, 
(b) change sensory-motor loops, (c) are 
transparent, i.e. not explicitly noticed, disap-
pear from consciousness in aid of the world 
they bring forth. 
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[Merleau-Ponty, 1945] Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenoménologie de la perception. Gallimard, 
Paris, 1945. 
[Heidegger, 1996] Heidegger, M., Being and Time, 
State University of New York Press, 1996. 
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